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Abstract 
This essay examines the letters of the Elizabethan intelligencer William Herle during 
a  period  of  intelligence-gathering  in  the  Low  Countries  in  1582.  Writing  to  his 
patrons  Lord  Burghley  and  Sir  Francis  Walsingham,  Herle’s  letters  offer  a  rich 
landscape of detail and information. Yet these are not simply ‘administrative’ letters 
devoid of emotive expression, but display epistolary structures designed to maintain 
patronage,  and  attempting  to  recreate  the  distance  between  correspondent  and 
recipient. While Herle was in Antwerp, there was an assassination attempt against 
William of Orange. Herle was keen to convey ‘breaking news’ as quickly as possible, 
and bridge the geographical distance between the English court and Delft, where the 
attempt occurred. In anticipation of pitfalls in postage, and to ensure that each of his 
recipients received the same intelligence at the same time, Herle increasingly opted to 
send ‘verbatim’ letters: duplicate copies of important correspondence. Letter-writers 
could also employ diverse methods to avoid interception and perusal, such as ciphers 
and the accompaniment of bearers. In this way, the letter might travel unnoticed, or 
under  protection.  These  ideas  of  envoys  and  letters  disseminating  through  porous 
membranes, ideally, but not necessarily, authorised and endorsed by the authorities 
are tantalising. I explore this transmission and translation, and attempt to determine 
through  his  letters  the  relationship  between  Herle  and  his  correspondents;  writing 
from a location without, reinforcing his liminal status as both spy and informant, 
decentralized yet essential to the English political landscape. 
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“Wherwith humbly comendyng me to your Lords good favor, I take mi leve for this tyme, desyrows 
with mi harte, that ye wolld employe me yn somwhatt yn these parts, and therewith to yngrave yn her 
majesties gracyows oppynion, the remembrance of a zelows poore servant of hers.”
i 
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  In  the  later  half  of  the  sixteenth  century,  England’s  ministers  relied  on 
unofficial and private information networks to supply information about foreign and 
domestic  subjects.  Among  the  admixture  of  these  crown-  and  privately-funded 
networks  were  structures  of  communication  and  exchange  built  upon  patronage 
relationships, and these societal bonds were constructed and maintained in part by the 
transmission  of  fresh  and  sensitive  intelligence  by  letter  and  in  person.  Within 
Elizabeth I’s Privy Council, William Cecil Lord Burghley, Sir Francis Walsingham, 
the  Earl  of  Leicester  and  the  Earl  of  Essex  were  the  key  ministers  significantly 
responsible  for  compiling  copious  and  diverse  tranches  of  information,  with  an 
impressive geographical, political, religious and social scope. In this essay I propose 
to interrogate the relationships between these ministers and their agents, by examining 
the  epistolary  forms  and  strategies  deployed  in  the  intelligence  letters  of  William 
Herle.
ii I will focus on a particular sequence of Herle’s correspondence addressed to 
Walsingham,  Leicester  and  Burghley,  written  at  a  critical  point  in  English 
intervention in the Low Countries conflict. I intend to use this cache of letters as a 
case-study, to see what Herle’s epistolary legacy can reveal about the important role 
played by unofficial agents, intelligencers and spies in the diplomatic context. 
  William  Herle  was  an  agent  of  these  three  politically  powerful  figures. 
Inhabiting the grey area between diplomat, agent, intelligencer and spy, his letter-
writing activity demonstrates the elastic and fluid nature of information gathering and 
exchange during this period. Although he was employed in official diplomatic work 
in  the  mid-1580s  when  he  was  sent  as  a  special  envoy  to  East  Friesland  on  the 
northern borders of the Netherlands and Germany, Herle’s more typical pursuits were 
located at the polar end of licensed diplomatic function, rarely possessing official 
remit or instructions but rather having unofficial, tacit endorsement to visit, discuss or  
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negotiate with foreign sovereigns and statesmen.
iii Herle’s ‘agency’ was based firmly 
upon  this  collection  and  dissemination  of  information,  but  seems  also  to  have 
extended to communication with ministers and leading figures in the Low Countries. 
This activity, endorsed by the English ministers responsible for steering foreign and 
domestic  policy,  reveals  an  alternative,  more  informal  ‘tier’  of  contact  and 
correspondence  with  friendly  nations  than  that  of  the  ceremonial  envoy  or 
ambassador, who was constrained to adhere to the protocols and processes by which 
formal negotiation was required to proceed. 
Herle’s background is cloudy; no letters from him survive before 1558, and 
other than his letters, there are only rare glimpses of him in the historical record. A 
comment in a later letter to Burghley notes that he had been in the household of Sir 
William  Garrard,  a  successful  London  merchant  with  strong  links  to  the  northern 
European cloth marts. There is some evidence that at around the time of Elizabeth’s 
succession  and  in  the  years  following,  Herle  was  recruited  by  Cecil  to  act  as  an 
unofficial envoy to several northern European rulers in the guise of a merchant.
iv The 
evidence suggests that Herle was acting as Cecil’s agent whilst employed by Garrard 
(it’s likely that Herle was an apprentice or factor for the merchant), illustrating the 
convenient links between commerce and political information gathering for mobile 
members of society. Between this period in the fifteen-sixties and 1582, where this 
essay concentrates, Herle was, variously, a pirate, a prison spy, an unofficial envoy, 
and a seasoned gatherer of information. In this way, Herle undertook a self-modifying 
process, shaping his role to suit the occasion, and adapting to the grade of ‘service’ 
and  function  required  of  him  in  order  to  maintain  favour  with  his  politically 
heavyweight patrons. Aware that the ministers responsible for the security and active 
policy of England depended on a steady stream of fresh and fertile information, Herle  
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fixed  his  sights  on  being  a  source  of  intelligence  in  exchange  for  favour  and 
preferment.  Insolvent  to  the  point  of  frequent  imprisonment  for  debt,  Herle’s 
permanent objective was to secure gainful employment in the service of the crown. In 
order to establish his credentials, he performed activities that usually revolved around 
the pursuit of information pertaining to the health and security of the realm. It is my 
contention in this essay that there is a tension in the interstices of where this activity 
of information-gathering towards a political goal meets the aspiration for monetary 
reward. 
  Herle followed two of his patrons, Leicester and Walsingham, to the Low 
Countries  in  the  winter  of  1582.  Departing  from  Sandwich  harbour  on  the  8
th  of 
February, the two ministers were responsible for escorting Henri, Duke of Anjou to 
Antwerp, the city from where the Dutch revolt was being coordinated. Anjou, fresh 
from his unsuccessful courtship of Queen Elizabeth, was preparing to be invested as 
the new titular sovereign of the Netherlands, strengthening and leading the alliance 
between France, England and the Low Countries in the revolt against Spain. Arriving 
at Flushing in very rough seas, Herle left England’s shores in order to escape his 
creditors and act as an intermediary for the profusion of information circulating in the 
region.
v Leicester and Walsingham returned to England at the end of February, and 
Herle remained in Antwerp. Upon their departure, Herle began a six-month campaign 
of sending regular intelligence letters to Burghley, Leicester and Walsingham, which 
survives as a mostly unilateral correspondence.
vi In his early letters Herle described 
Anjou’s political progress: his formal reception by the representatives of the seven 
United  Provinces  of  the  Low  Countries,  the  oath  he  was  required  to  take,  and 
disagreements arising from his insistence in openly inviting the Catholics of Brabant 
and  Flanders  to  attend  mass.  Herle  notified  Leicester  that  he  had  instigated  the  
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beginnings of his own private information network, the news from which would be 
disseminated back to England with regular dispatch, 
I  am  entred  into  the  familyaritye  and  nere  fryndship  of  vi  or  vii  of  the 
principall state men of this Contrey, wherby I am hable to infforme my sellf of 
sondrie secretes, and of the knowledge of theyre state from time to tyme the 
more, to the good servyce of our Contreye, and the satisfactyon of her majestie 
and yow.
vii   
By writing letters which ran to several folio pages in length, and which contained 
detailed news of military manoeuvres against the Spanish army, economic matters, 
intellectual  developments  and  dynastic  matches,  Herle  attempted  to  make  himself 
invaluable to the administrative machine back at the English court.  
His official position in Antwerp in relation to English interests is unclear. His 
letters  describe  meetings  and  conversations  with  leading  statesmen  in  the  Low 
Countries, including personal access to William, Prince of Orange, which would have 
not been possible without endorsement and letters of credence from the queen.
viii At 
this  point,  Elizabeth  did  not  have  a  formal  diplomatic  representative  in  the  Low 
Countries, maintaining that the voluntary military personnel active in the conflict with 
Spain  were  not  connected  to  English  foreign  policy.  George  Gilpin,  another 
intelligence  agent  based  in  Antwerp,  was  unsure  of  Herle’s  status.  In  a  letter  to 
Walsingham, Gilpin declared he was forwarding several letters that had arrived at his 
own  desk  (a  common  strategy  of  overseas  agents  which  preserved  their  meagre 
resources), noting that Walsingham could test the veracity of the intelligence in the 
enclosed letters against those reports he would receive by other agents in the field, 
naming Herle as an example,  
 
 
6 
By the lettres herewith sent, the presente newes here will better appeare then I 
canne write, and yet as parte of my bounden dewtie, would not omitt to add 
hereunto  that  which  I  could  learne,  submitting  the  certaintie  therof  to  the 
writing  of  others  that  have  leasure  and  comme  in  place  to  understand  the 
same. Amongest others Mr William Earle, who saieth himself to be left here 
as Agent for the Earle of Lecestre, and so is of somme reputed, though also 
otherwise suspected.
ix 
Resident in Antwerp in a guise which was not immediately recognizable to another 
agent  of  his  cadre  (Gilpin  was  another  member  of  the  commercial  agent  turned 
intelligence-gatherer fraternity), it seems that soon after his arrival, Herle already had 
a reputation for being a portal for information. 
  Many intelligence letters from the period are simple reports, listing facts with 
little  attempt  to  decorate  the  information  with  social  niceties.  Many  are  even 
anonymous, either at the time of dispatch, or because information pertaining to the 
correspondent (commonly on a separate cover letter or address leaf) has been lost. 
The content of some letters survive where the original letter has not, having been 
extracted  and  summarized  at  the  time  of  receipt  by  the  office  of  the  Principal 
Secretary. Diplomatic correspondence sent by official delegates of the English crown 
tended to concentrate on the issue at hand, i.e. the special mission for which the envoy 
had been sent, or the ongoing negotiation of the resident ambassador, and adding 
items of intelligence on an intermittent basis.
x Herle’s correspondence adheres to the 
social  formulae  of  contemporary  epistolarity,  articulating  florid,  (if  submissive), 
aspirational gestures towards employment, reward and service. Often placed directly 
after  or  linked  to  a  particularly  salacious  item  of  news,  or  prior  to  subscription,  
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Herle’s  petitory  requests  and  confirmation  of  ongoing  service  and  loyalty  to  the 
crown  were  pronounced,  especially  during  this  period  in  1582.  In  May,  Herle 
requested to Walsingham that he intercede in a dispute over his debt to the Waad 
family, interposing information relating to Mary Queen of Scots, 
The  Bishop  of  Rosses  genelogye  and  his  booke  withall  in  Latten  of  the 
scotissh tytell to the Crown of England, hath byn grettlye axed for and solld at 
this Frankfords mart, which of mi knowledge I dare affirme, for I provyded 
my  sellf  there  of  som  few  bookes,  and  had  trew  advertisment  hereof. 
Wherwith I humblye fynissheng, do comend M
r Wades cawse and myne to 
your  honorable  decysyon,  which  I  do  pray  yow  to  do  somewhatt  yn,  for 
charitye sake.
xi 
  Herle’s letters are richly studded with reports of continental affairs, in which 
he  assembled  information  collated  from  personal  conversations,  his  own 
correspondence,  and  forwarded  lists  and  collections  of  his  own  gathering.  The 
impulse behind such transmission is clearly articulated in his letters, 
I wrytt to your Lord by these late postes, 5 or 6 lettres wheryn were conteyned 
sondrye  advertysments  and  papers  of  collectyons,  which  I  hope  shall  not 
mislyke your good Lord nor leave unexpressed the desyre I have to serve 
yow.
xii 
As well as these lists, advertisements and digests of the current situation in Antwerp, 
Herle was keen to dispatch relevant printed material, as far as his pocket would allow. 
Books and pamphlets tracking the progress of the revolt, and even scribal duplicates 
of printed matter when copies were scarce made their way to the pulsing intelligence  
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centre  of  Elizabeth’s  Privy  Council.  Upon  his  arrival  in  Antwerp,  Herle  waited 
patiently for La Joyeuse et Magnifique Entrée, a book with extensive engravings and 
describing Anjou’s symbolic entry into the city issued from the press of Christopher 
Plantin. He assured Leicester, Burghley and Walsingham that he would procure and 
send the books at his own expense as soon as they were available to purchase.
xiii On 
the 18
th of March he wrote to Burghley,  
when ytt comes furthe in prynte, your Lord shall have the fyrst Drawght that 
shalbe sene therof sent yow by me, yf I were riche (as these thinges do coste 
money) yow sholld have more thinges, butt your Lord will bere with this in 
the mene tyme, for I have no ayde here but God and my sellf and yow knowe 
best my habilitye.
xiv 
Later the same evening, Antwerp was rocked by crisis. As William of Orange 
walked out of the dining hall after dinner at his palace in Antwerp, a man in the crowd 
of onlookers ran forward and shot him point blank in the face with a handgun.
xv The 
gun misfired and exploded in his hand, blowing the assailant’s thumb clean off. The 
bullet  entered  William’s  cheek,  the  explosion  of  the  bullet  singeing  his  hair  and 
setting fire to his ruff. In the panic and confusion, and as William was removed to 
another room, the would-be assassin was seized and beaten to death by Orange’s 
bodyguards,  a  gruesome  sight  witnessed  by  William’s  young  son  Maurice.
xvi 
Examined in his chamber by a group of surgeons, they confirmed that the bullet had 
passed through his cheek and palate from left to right, grazing the maxillary artery 
and causing extensive loss of blood. In this confusion, rumours that the Prince was 
dead were flying around Antwerp. The corpse of the assailant, a stolid clerk by the  
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name of Jean Jaureguy, later found to be in the pay of the Spanish, was dragged into 
the main town square of Antwerp, and his body laid out to view. 
  When Herle learned of the attempt on William’s life, he wasted little time in 
dispatching an advertisement – now lost – on the 19
th of March reporting the recent 
climacteric events. The following day Herle sent a lengthy account of the state of the 
Low Countries as a result of the assault. In addition to the rumours circulating around 
the area that the Prince was dead, many believed that the Duke of Anjou was involved 
in the attack because the assailant had been dressed in the French style. This first 
surviving letter about the assassination attempt survives in two copies, one addressed 
each to Burghley and Leicester. Judging from his extant correspondence from this 
period, Herle registered that he was in an excellent position: having already situated 
himself in Antwerp as a vital node in the English intelligence network, and having an 
ear to the breaking news and developments within the political circles surrounding 
William of Orange, he was perfectly placed to report back with exigency the weighty 
consequences of the incident as they unfolded. He saw an opportunity to consolidate 
his unofficial position as intelligence-gatherer for the English crown with legitimate 
and prominent diplomatic activity which would invest him with a certain modicum of 
political gravity, and he accordingly took advantage of the situation as it developed.  
He wrote to Leicester, 
Yf her majestie or ^
ani of^ her cowncell in partycler, do wryte to condole this 
action with the prince, yt most be don presently and yf I be thowght fytt, I will 
discharge the office of delyveryng those lettres, and of the further servyce that 
I shalbe comanded.
 xvii  
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Herle reported that the survival of Orange was doubtful; the wound would not cease 
bleeding,  his  surgeons  would  not  permit  him  to  speak  and  insisted  on  personally 
holding a pad of lint to staunch the flow at all times of the day and night. Herle’s 
accounts of the state of the wound were thorough, if alarmist. If William was to die, 
the  delicate  alliance  between  the  Low  Countries,  England  and  France  might 
disintegrate and be at the mercy of Spanish forces led by Alessandro Farnese, Duke of 
Parma. Up-to-the-minute news was vital to keep his ministerial patrons in command 
of the situation in order to swiftly implement decisive action should William perish of 
his wound.  
  Few reports of this incident from English agents survive in the archives. Herle 
was aware that his would not be the first account to reach his patrons; indeed, he 
would have realized that the incident warranted a special trip back home to impart the 
news in person. Walsingham’s agent Etienne Lesieur assessed the communication 
landscape in equal measure, reporting 
on  the  18
th  between  noon  and  1  o’clock  a  strange  rumour  arose  of  the 
wounding of the Prince of Orange. The details of this I will excuse myself 
from writing to you, several gentlemen having been there who by this time are 
on your side, besides that I am sure you will hear it in detail from those who 
know how it all happened.
xviii 
Colonel John Norris went further, making a brief report to Walsingham of the event 
and noting,  
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I persuade myself that ill newes flye faster then my letters cann passe; yet I 
could not but advertise your Honour of the vilainous treason invented and 
executed against the Prince of Orange.
xix 
Herle’s  letters  following  the  assassination  attempt  record  in  detail  the  politically 
volatile situation, and demonstrate that Herle was keen to supply fresh information as 
the events unfolded, especially if Orange’s condition changed. In the hasty dispatches 
sent  back  to  England,  there  is  a  discernible  note  of  uncertainty,  of  reporting  the 
‘strange rumour’ of the attack on Orange. Herle’s position in Antwerp afforded him at 
least  a  passing  chance  at  gathering  intelligence  which  was  endorsed  by  Orange’s 
circle, and could therefore be classified as an accurate report of events. In a letter of 
the 21
st of March he indicated that the medical practitioners supervising Orange’s 
treatment were not confident of his recovery. He informed Leicester that Orange’s 
condition was now looking especially grave,  
In the general lettre written to your Lord yesterday, I thowght good to omitt 
this that followith, as matter of more ymportance and secresye, to be cowched 
a parte.  
  Ytt is thowght by Gaspar the Surgyen, who hath charge (among others) 
of the Prynces wound, that he cannot escape, for that the Artherye is towched 
… that make the cure owtt of hope. Therefore do I send this berer mi servant 
John Morgan of purpose, to … her majestie by your Lords honorable menes, 
and will not fayll from ynstant to ynstant (having the ynsynuatyons that I 
have) to advertys whatt allteracyon, ether his person, or the matters of State do 
suffer here.
xx  
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In supporting the cost of his servant John Morgan as bearer, whose errand and journey 
would place pressure on his already diminished finances, Herle was committed to 
dispatching  his  servant  to  communicate  the  (prematurely)  unfortunate  news  in 
person.
xxi  
  The ‘ymportance’ and  ‘secresye’ with which Herle regarded as necessary the 
transmission  of  the  latest  diagnosis  from  the  surgeon  is  a  recurring  refrain  in  his 
letters from this tumultuous period, and throughout his wider correspondence. Aware 
that  the  information  in  his  letters  was  a  precious  commodity,  and,  from  his  own 
perspective, one which held the key to his ongoing favour and patronage with his 
politically powerful correspondents, Herle employed diverse measures to protect the 
information contained within the fragile and easily-intercepted letter packet. In the 
days following the assault on Orange, Herle took the opportunity to send exhaustive 
written accounts of the assassination attempt and the ensuing chaos which charged 
through Antwerp and the Low Countries beyond. One of these accounts, comprising 
four  folio  pages  of  cramped  script,  was  sent  to  Leicester,  with  another  copy  to 
Burghley. In the cover letter enclosing the copy to Burghley, Herle noted, 
I do send your Lorde herynclosed, the copies of my ii last lettres written to the 
Earl of Lecester verbatim.
xxii 
Herle  was  diligent  in  scrupulously  providing  duplicate  intelligence  to  his  patrons, 
deploying a single bearer to deliver verbatim copies of letters along his route, 
Att this present I do send this berer mi servant of purpose to my Lord of 
Lecester, with advertisments of ymportance, ynclosyng heryn the copye of  
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eche thyng that I do wryte to mi sayd Lord of Lecester Verbatim, omitteng noe 
one syllable.
xxiii 
Herle’s practice of sending ‘verbatim’ intelligence letters enabled his correspondents 
to consult and confer on information from a trusted source, and ensured maximum 
coverage between prominent members of Elizabeth’s Privy Council. This method of 
communication,  common  among  correspondents  overseas  or  along  unpredictable 
postal routes, provided an added layer of security to a postal system riddled with 
pitfalls and hazards. Should a letter be intercepted, lost in the channel crossing, or 
delayed along its route, a letter sent separately to a ministerial colleague had the 
chance of arriving safely, and the information could be shared towards a common 
purpose.    
  The  verbatim  letter  offered  more  than  simply  the  guarantee  of  delivery, 
however. In sending copies of his letters to Leicester to the hands of Burghley, Herle 
was  making  a  point  of  offering  Burghley  the  same  information  as  he  offered 
Leicester,  situating  himself  as  the  point  of  contact  between  the  two  as  a  hub  of 
information  exchange.  The  tripartite  readership  engendered  by  the  dispatch  of  a 
verbatim  letter,  with  Herle  as  the  principal  (if  distant)  source,  offered  him  the 
invaluable opportunity to simultaneously address the key ministers responsible for 
foreign policy. It is possible that Herle envisaged Burghley and Leicester using his 
letters as the main source of information about the matter of the Prince of Orange’s 
doubtful recovery. His insistent and repeated employment of this strategy, one which 
served  the  dual  purpose  of  conserving  his  own  resources  while  broadcasting  to  a 
wider audience than the traditionally dyadic epistolary relationship, suggests that his 
correspondents  responded  positively  to  this  method.
xxiv  Herle’s  insistence  on  
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duplicating the letters is significant. If the information included in a letter to one of 
Elizabeth’s councillors was considered to be of sufficient import, it was likely to be 
summarized  for,  shared  or  broadcast  at  a  council  meeting  or  privately  between 
ministers. That Herle considered it worthwhile to send verbatim copies suggests that 
he was at pains to extend and advertise his intelligence letters widely, rather than, say, 
merely providing extra copies of a standard digest of news in something other than an 
epistolary format. Herle’s frequent practice of sending duplicated letters to multiple 
correspondents does suggest that despite his marginal and obscure status, (and being 
‘suspected’ by fellow agents like Gilpin) the prominent figures governing foreign 
policy viewed Herle’s intelligence letters, and letters from similarly placed agents, as 
central to the information network and the practical functioning of the Tudor regime.  
  In  the  above  letter,  Herle  mentions  using  his  servant  as  a  bearer.  The 
employment  of  a  messenger  known  to  either  the  letter-writer  or  recipient  was  a 
prudent and cost-effective measure which ensured – to a certain extent – the safety of 
the correspondence. To avoid unnecessary costs, it made sense to dispatch letters with 
a trusted individual who was already making the journey.
xxv The private carriage of 
letters was an obvious foil to the corrupt practices of postmasters in the pay of hostile 
forces or interested parties.
xxvi From the frequent subscriptions or notes describing and 
vouching for these bearers we get a sense of a group of people accustomed to the 
hazards of travelling and methods of outwitting conspirators and others with designs 
on the politically decisive correspondence. Furthermore, if the route travelled by post 
and person was extremely hazardous, the letter-writer had the option of entrusting the 
most sensitive parts of the news to the oral transmission by the bearer, a common 
method  which  sadly  means  that  for  the  most  part,  the  information  imparted  ‘by 
mouth’ is now lost.  
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  Herle employed methods of securing his correspondence using ad hoc tactics 
where  the  occasion  suited.  Perceiving  Orange’s  condition  to  be  of  such  critical 
significance, as it required the utmost secrecy, Herle petitioned Burghley for the use 
of a cipher in order to protect the information in his letters even further,  
Yf  it  may  plese  your  Lord  to  send  me  spedylye  a  Cipher,  which  shalbe 
peculyer only to her majestie and your sellf, I will under the sayd Cipher, 
advertys yow of a matter that consernes her majesties Crown and person … 
Butt trulye there most be non more acqwainted with the sayd advertisments 
butt her majestie and your Lord alonely.
xxvii 
In most cases, when leaving England on legation, diplomats would be provided with a 
provisional cipher. However, this did not guarantee the inviolable protection of the 
diplomatic correspondence. Indeed, those ciphers which were provided to diplomats 
and agents, were usually outdated, endlessly recycled, easily cracked or known by 
counter-intelligence organizations. In 1590, Thomas Bodley, English representative to 
the Council of State, was issued with a standard diplomatic cipher upon departing 
England.
xxviii However, when it came to reporting matters of sensitivity which fell 
outside the areas covered by the official cipher, Bodley was obliged to request of 
Burghley  a  more  detailed  code  in  which  to  make  a  sufficiently  secure  report. 
Burghley responded positively, 
Wheare yowe require to have a Cipher, I doe at this present send yowe one, 
not verie curiouslie made for avoidinge of trowble to us both but yet sufficeint 
to serve our purpose, and maie be augmented as yowe see Cawse.
xxix  
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Encrypting letters, even only partially, was a time-consuming and cumbersome task 
requiring  a  significant  outlay  of  time  and  resources.  A  survey  of  diplomatic 
correspondence suggests that it was only the particularly sensitive material within a 
letter which the writer would encipher, which inconveniently drew attention to and 
advertised the parts of the letter the writer wanted to protect. Herle’s request for a 
cipher extends beyond the standard discourse of concern for the precarious carriage of 
information.  His  appeal  for  a  private  method  of  communication  between  only 
Burghley,  Queen  Elizabeth  and  himself  is  an  extension  of  the  scenario  described 
above in the case of the verbatim letter. In Herle’s fantasy, the private cipher, the key 
to which was only known to Burghley and Elizabeth, would create a restricted triad of 
correspondence  and  a  valuable  intimacy  based  upon  the  exchange  of  sensitive 
information.
xxx Indeed, Herle defers imparting the information to Burghley until the 
cipher  has  been  dispatched,  reversing  the  dynamic  of  power  in  the  patron-client 
relationship. No evidence survives to suggest that Burghley complied with Herle’s 
request, and the information Herle was at pains to conceal may have been assimilated 
into his letters (at which point the information blends with the other news and is 
difficult to separate) or sent by oral transmission with a bearer. Herle, as an unofficial 
agent (and here the distinctions are blurred between what constitutes a ‘private’ rather 
than a ‘crown’ intelligencer), would not have been a candidate for a royal cipher. 
Furthermore, it may be that Herle’s request for a cipher is merely an indicator that he 
is fit for purpose, and that by appealing for this method of secret communication 
Herle emphasises his credibility and efficiency.
xxxi 
  In  the  aftermath  of  the  assassination  attempt,  while  the  Low  Countries 
anxiously awaited the outcome of William’s injury, Herle concentrated on situating 
himself  as  the  intermediary  between  English  concerns  directed  through  Burghley,  
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Leicester  and  Walsingham,  and  prominent  figures  in  Antwerp.  Interceding  in  the 
appointment of English soldiers, passing along messages from principal statesmen, 
and suggesting routes of policy to be adopted by Elizabeth and her ministers, Herle 
was, if only unofficially, ‘our man’ in Antwerp. For Herle, the opportunity to grease 
the passage to preferment for a fellow Englishman elevated his status to more than 
merely  an  informer.  He  endorsed  the  suit  of  Colonel  Morgan  who  sought  the 
command of his own regiment, 
Your Lord most needes be good to Coronell morgan, who trewlye is a Tall 
sowdyor & an honest gentillman, asswell ynclyned to do your Lord service, as 
ani on that ever deppended of you. Yf you will vowchesave to allowe of his 
prefferment to a Regyment, I do fynde that bothe monsieur & the Prince of 
orenge be well ynclyned unto hym to favor hym, therfore ye sholld do very 
honorable to comande me by 3 lynes wrytten to your Lord by your L. to me to 
sollicite with monsieur the Prince of orenge, his advauncement before other 
yong fellowes that ar very busye to gett charges here, which will do nothyng 
elles butt sclander the service & natyon.
xxxii 
Here, Herle bolsters his position, or at least he position to which he aspired, as the 
nucleus  of  English  interests  abroad  in  terms  of  the  patronage  network  on  which 
military  appointments  were  made.  Citing  positive  endorsements  from  Anjou  and 
Orange (who was still unable to speak, and could only conduct the management of the 
revolt by writing directions on paper), he advertised what he saw as his significant 
political connections. Participating in this localized patronage system in a different 
role than his usual position in the hinterland of English hierarchy, Herle viewed the 
successful  selection  of  Colonel  [Thomas]  Morgan  as  a  move  which  would  have  
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several positive outcomes. Orange and Anjou would receive the commander of their 
choice, England’s interests would be served (in Herle’s view, the appointment of the 
alternative candidates who were ‘busye to gett charges’ would be harmful) and Herle 
would have the satisfaction of having engineered the advantageous conclusion, which 
in itself might engender its own reward in the form of a gift from the successful party. 
  One  month  after  the  assassination  attempt  on  Orange,  Herle  was  keen  to 
formalize his position as ‘agent for the Earle of Lecestre’. In a letter which described 
the secret attitude to Queen Elizabeth of Pierre Loiseleur, Sieur de Villiers, adviser to 
the Prince of Orange, Herle suggested a route to preferment which would suit all 
parties, 
For which & mani other resons that I understand, I do know that it is nott 
necessarye for her majestie to have any publick Agent here, Lest she sholld be 
openlye  qwarrelled  with,  yett  to  yntertayne  with  a  convenyent  allowans 
underhand, on that sholld have vigilancye & nere dutye in hym, towards her 
servyce,  methyncks  (I  speke  it  under  favor)  that  it  were  most  necessarye, 
wheryn remember me, your L. trew & faythfull follower.
xxxiii 
Stoutly  recommending  himself  for  the  service  which  he  was  already  effectively 
performing, Herle’s suggestion carried with it an implicit request for remuneration. A 
frequent tactic of Herle’s was to couple a particularly sensitive and potent item of 
intelligence with a request that his situation might be made permanent, or at least 
salaried.  The  exchange  of  intelligence,  in  his  eyes,  could  be  reciprocated  by  a 
favourable advancement of his prospects. In the same letter in which he ruefully noted 
his reprimand for being too hasty in doubting the Prince of Orange’s recovery, Herle 
robustly listed his credentials as an intelligencer, drawing attention to local negative  
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feeling  towards  English  policy.  He  required  a  steady  flow  of  monies  in  order  to 
maintain and expand his sources, 
I want only mayntenance & cowntenance, which her majestie might easelye 
supplye,  yf  she  wolld  be  enclyned  to  ad  som  portyon  towards  the  same. 
Wherof she hath more neede to looke unto than I, for bothe her States & 
person ar hated & envyed, & so be yow of her Cowncell, which will breke 
owtt yn practys & actyon, uppon the first occasyon, wherof when it shall plese 
her majestie I will give her more partyculer ynfformatyon.
xxxiv 
 
Here,  Herle  characteristically  defers  the  information  until  a  later  date,  no  doubt 
holding out for a promising elevation in his prospects or finances. Significantly, the 
financial  aspect,  ‘maintenance’,  is  figured  as  going  hand-in-hand  with  official 
recognition of his service, ‘cowntenance’, carrying with it a connotation of patronage 
and support.
xxxv   
This  strategy  of  Herle’s,  which  juxtaposed  information  of  serious  political 
significance  with  requests  and  palpable  hints  at  official  profitable  employment 
repeatedly failed in the middle period of Elizabeth’s reign. Disseminating information 
in order to maintain his patronage relationships, it is likely that the ‘valuable’ position 
in which he found himself, i.e. being perfectly and unofficially placed to elicit, digest 
and communicate information, denied him the prospect of moving into the higher, 
more  professionalized  echelons  of  the  Elizabethan  diplomatic  corps.  After  several 
years of constant petition, Herle was finally awarded the post of special ambassador 
to East Friesland, (an assignment that left him significantly financially straitened). 
Herle  recognized  that  for  his  individual  circumstances  it  was  through  the  careful  
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regulation of political information, whether by the careful transmission of intelligence 
or the satisfactory negotiation with foreign princes, that he would be able to obtain 
employment closer to the centre of political power, i.e. a clerkship or officer for the 
crown.  
This route to preferment was a growing trend in Tudor bureaucracy. Clerical 
credentials were established in the diplomatic arena where legates displaying an equal 
measure of patriotic and organizational enthusiasm were ideally placed to move into 
lucrative positions within government upon returning from their successful embassy. 
While diplomatic employment was not an end to remuneration itself (indeed, far from 
it), it supplied the Tudor government with a dedicated coterie of skilled bureaucrats 
who,  upon  their  return  home,  could  contribute  to  the  ceaseless  administrative 
machine.  Those  involved  in  diplomatic  affairs,  from  varying  areas  of  the  social 
spectrum,  provided  a  sympathetic  and  well-connected  group  of  proficient  men  on 
whom  the  Elizabethan  authorities  could  draw  for  further  employment  upon  their 
return home.
xxxvi The quotidian activity of the embassy, comprising of heavily paper-
based tasks, including making surveys of affairs, summary letters, frank letters of 
opinion, suggesting alignments towards alliances and writing papers and reports all 
lent themselves well towards the kind of duties expected in a government office upon 
return  home  to  England.
xxxvii  Despite  being  a  training-ground  for  lucrative 
government appointment upon their return home, most diplomats and official envoys 
bemoaned  the  time  spent  away  from  home.  Ironically,  despite  the  training  for 
professional life and political acumen obtained during the embassy, they complained 
of  the  geographical  distance  between  their  patrons  and  themselves,  which  had  a 
detrimental effect on their career prospects.
xxxviii  
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Herle’s  correspondence  from  this  period  exhibits  the  standard  epistolary 
formulae  inherent  in  Elizabethan  letters.  The  bald  facts  and  figures  –  the 
administrative elements of the letters – collated from several months spent on the 
continent, are juxtaposed and dressed with codified and conventional expressions of 
service, humility and friendship, 
My lettre Right honorable, dated the 28 of Aprill, and ment to have byn sent 
by the post to your honor, was stayed uppon som occasyon tyll now, which 
this berer shall delyver yow and a booke therewith: besekying that thowgh ytt 
com late, ye will nott yett despise the humble menyng I have, which is to do 
yow ani service I can with mi harte.
xxxix 
Founded  upon  textual  affect,  attempting  to  recreate  the  distance  between 
correspondent and recipient, the letters were Herle’s sole method of communication 
when separated from his patrons. They sought to compensate for the distance between 
correspondents. These letters were transactions -  ‘gifts’ of knowledge in exchange for 
the stalling of debts, the granting of offices or official service to the crown – and their 
content of political intelligence made them extremely valuable.
xl For Herle, his letters 
to the political triumvirate of Leicester, Burghley and Walsingham were vehicles for 
his  patron-client  bond,  a  bond  given  impetus  and  currency  by  the  exchange  of 
information.  For  Elizabeth’s  ministers,  Herle’s  letters  were  political  tools,  stuffed 
with  potent  intelligence,  and  for  whom  the  delicately  wrought  (yet  standard) 
epistolary forms designed to convey intimacy and friendship were a conventional, but 
decidedly secondary, requirement. 
  Herle’s position in Antwerp was ostensibly as an agent of Leicester, yet his 
divided trajectories of intelligence reports suggest that his role was founded upon a  
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split patron-client relationship, with the incentive to supply Leicester, Burghley and 
Walsingham with equivalent numbers of letters. Herle supposed that the efficient, 
well-tested  and  regular  stream  of  information  might  lead  to  a  more  formal 
engagement, whether at home or abroad. He aspired to extend his ‘agency’ further, to 
consolidate the multiple features of his work in Antwerp and to shape a protean role 
which included the diligent and pragmatic collection and dissemination of news and 
information in a secure and efficient manner. His intention to win preferment through 
the judicious exchange of time-sensitive information crucial to the ongoing safety of 
English  interests  was  managed  through  the  pragmatic  and  assiduous  collation, 
digestion and dissemination of intelligence. Through the careful communication of 
sensitive news and potentially inflammatory information, Herle signalled his ability to 
safeguard secrets in accordance with the leading guidelines on the administration of 
state information of the time.
xli  
  William Herle offers the scholar a useful example of how agency was figured 
and  configured  in  the  early  modern  period.  The  boundary  between  ‘official’ 
diplomatic activity and intelligencing for profit, however deferred, was porous and 
elastic. Moving away from the unhelpful and vague term ‘spy’ (although, of all the 
handles given to these figures in the period, ‘spy’ or ‘espyall’ would probably feature 
most often, and carrying a pejorative sense), a focus on these men like Herle, who 
operated on the fringes of government activity, enables us to begin to anatomize the 
amorphous private and crown Elizabethan information networks of the early modern 
period. The group of agents who sent select items of news to appropriate ministers or 
court figures with whom they had a connection (however tenuous), whom we may 
also term intelligencers or informers, fed and fortified the decision-making process of 
statesmen. Herle’s status as a conduit through which informal correspondence and  
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negotiation could occur between prominent English and Low Countries statesmen 
suggests that essential diplomatic activity was not limited to those sent out of England 
with instructions issued by the Queen and Privy Council. Reward for diplomatic work 
was  not  limited  to  high  status  figures,  as  the  skills  acquired  on  legation  were 
eminently transferable to a government administrative department upon return home.  
Agents  like  Herle  operated  on  behalf  of  England’s  ministers,  through  the 
transmission of information, discussion with local officers or even conversation with 
the host monarch. Patriotic zeal and religious fervour aside, for many agents, the 
impulse for collecting information was basic – to ensure the means of subsistence. 
Intelligencing for personal profit, albeit through the service of the crown, could call 
the agent’s allegiance into question. The repeated affirmations of loyalty and humble 
service  with  which  information-gatherers  like  Herle’s  correspondence  is  flecked, 
suggest  that  the  agent’s  visible  interconnectedness  within  the  endorsed  patronage 
structures  of  early  modern  England  went  some  way  to  mitigate  this  economic 
tension.
xlii  Uniting  the  dual  impulses  of  protecting  Elizabeth  and  her  realm  and 
advancing his own prospects, Herle’s letters open to wider view the methods and 
technologies of the communication of intelligence, founded upon and driven by a 
sophisticated and intricate patronage network. 
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